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INTRODUCTION 
Inside a nondescript, windowless building on the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, pretrial hearings are underway for Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed and other foreign nationals accused of terrorist-
related crimes by the U.S. government.1 Aside from a sign proclaiming 
“Camp Justice” that sits below a collection of flag poles several yards 
away, one would never suspect that this building, on the site of an 
abandoned airfield, houses the much-debated military commissions. Now 
in their third year, the military commissions continue to be a lightning 
rod for criticism from both inside and outside the legal community.2 The 
general consensus among opponents of the commissions is that the 
proceedings are simply a rubber stamp for the prosecution, designed to 
guarantee the conviction and the timely execution of the accused.3  While 
critics point to several reasons as to why the commissions are 
purportedly unfair to the accused, one of their strongest allegations 
  
 1. DOD Announces Charges Referred Against 9-11 Co-Conspirators, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF. (Apr. 4, 2012),  
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15158. 
 2. Ian Kysel & Aryeh Neier Fellow, Guántanamo Dispatch: Improvising Basic 
Trial Rights, ACLU (June 19, 2013, 10:11 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-
security-human-rights/guantanamo-dispatch-improvising-basic-trial-rights. 
 3. See A Plan to Close Guantánamo and End the Military Commissions, ACLU, 
6-7, 8, 14-15 (Jan. 2009),  
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/images/asset_upload_file505_38424.pdf. 
178 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.1 
 
centers around the government’s planned use of hearsay that would 
otherwise be inadmissible in traditional federal criminal trials.4 
Because the rules of evidence for military commissions have been 
written to allow for the introduction of certain hearsay evidence, critics 
argue that this makes the commissions inherently biased and 
illegitimate.5 There is no question that the stringent protections for 
criminal defendants in the American court system, stemming from the 
Confrontation Clause in the Constitution, do not apply universally to the 
commissions’ defendants. The assumption, however, that the military 
commissions must provide all the protections and rights found in the 
American court system or else lack legitimacy in the eyes of the world 
represents a false choice.  There is clearly a middle ground that cannot be 
ignored. The reality is that while the rules of evidence in military 
commissions do allow for the admission of certain kinds of hearsay, 
otherwise not admissible in federal court, its use is widely accepted in 
similar international tribunals and appropriate protections are in place to 
balance any prejudice to the defendants.  
The opponents of the commissions claim the government will use 
secret witnesses, and convict based solely on uncorroborated, unreliable 
hearsay, that may or may not have been the product of unlawful 
interrogation techniques.6 It is not hard to see why such an idea can be 
appealing to those skeptical of the commissions. After all, the 
proceedings occur largely out of reach for most Americans. Unlike a trial 
in federal court, where any member of the public is welcome to view the 
proceedings, observing the military commissions in Guantanamo Bay 
requires lots of advance planning, travel accommodations, and clearance 
from the Department of Defense. 
As an alternative, many government leaders, activists and scholars 
alike have advocated for the trying of the terrorist suspects in federal 
court. Although the U.S. Justice Department obtained a grand jury 
indictment against the 9/11 conspirators, plans to try them in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York were later 
  
 4. Kenneth Roth, Op-Ed., Justice Cheated, N.Y. TIMES, (May 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes/com/2012/05/07/opinion/justice-cheated.html?_r=0. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id.; see also Kysel, supra note 2. 
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abandoned, much to the chagrin of certain groups, and the military 
commissions proceeded in Guantanamo Bay.7 This article does not seek 
to address the issue of whether a Guantanamo Bay military commission 
is the most appropriate forum to try the suspected terrorists. There are 
some very strong arguments that trying these suspects in a federal 
courthouse would be more efficient, less expensive and more 
transparent.8 Nevertheless, this article posits that the military 
commissions are still providing the defendants with adequate due 
process, with appropriate legal protections, and are being conducted in 
accordance with widely accepted international law. Part I of this article 
discusses a history of the military commissions and how the body of 
legal rights assigned to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay have grown 
over the years. Part II discusses the use of hearsay in international courts 
and tribunals in recent history. Part III analyzes the specific 
circumstances in which hearsay is likely to arise in the military 
commissions and its potential impact on these proceedings. 
I.    THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, FROM 2001 TO 
PRESENT 
Since the first prisoners of the War on Terror were captured on the 
battlefields of Afghanistan, the rights and legal statuses of detainees have 
evolved significantly. The procedural protections afforded to the accused 
in today’s military commissions in Guantanamo Bay are vastly different 
from the rights that existed at the time the idea of the military 
commissions first came about. In 2001, The Authorization for Use of 
Military Force gave the President the authority to use “all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks 
  
 7. Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Refers Five Accused 9/11 
Plotters to Military Commissions, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 4, 2011),  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-ag-421.html.  
 8. Don Borelli, Trying Terrorist in Civilian Court is the Right Move, THE HILL 
CONG. BLOG (Oct. 17, 2013),  
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/328939-trying-terrorist-in-
civilian-court-is-the-right-move. 
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that occurred on September 11, 2001.”9 That included “the power to 
capture and detain those described in the congressional authorization. 
The government may therefore hold at Guantanamo and elsewhere those 
individuals who are part of al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated forces.”10 
The law did not provide the detainees with the right to challenge their 
detention in court or address the burden the government must meet in 
order to detain them.11 
Shortly thereafter, President George W. Bush issued an executive 
order authorizing the use of military commissions to try suspected 
terrorists.12 The rules of evidence under this plan were extremely loose, 
and nowhere in the order does it mention the word “hearsay.”13 Rather, it 
allowed for the introduction of any evidence at the military commission, 
provided that a “reasonable person” would find it had probative value 
either: (1) in the opinion of the Presiding Officer, or (2) in the opinion of 
the majority of the commission, if any of the members of the commission 
requested to have the commission make the determination in lieu of 
relying upon the view of the Presiding Officer.14 
But before the first suspects could be tried by military commission, 
multiple habeas petitions on behalf of the captives were working their 
way through the federal court system. What resulted was a tug of war, 
between the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the Courts as to the 
appropriate rights and procedures for the detainees at Guantanamo. In 
2004, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in the case of 
Rasul v. Bush, finding that the degree of control exercised by the United 
States over the Guantanamo Bay base was sufficient to trigger the 
application of habeas corpus rights for the detainee.15 This was 
essentially the first time that the Court affirmatively recognized at least 
  
 9. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 
224 (2001). 
 10. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004)). 
 11. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d at 1103.  
 12. Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. 
 15. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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certain legal rights pertain to the detainees. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which 
was decided on the same day as Rasul, the Court also considered the 
rights of a U.S. citizen detained in Guantanamo as an enemy combatant 
and addressed the issue of hearsay as it pertains to enemy combatants.16 
In that case, a U.S. citizen who was captured in Afghanistan and 
designated an enemy combatant challenged his confinement claiming 
that his detention, based on a third-party hearsay affidavit, violated the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.17 In its decision, the Court recognized 
that: 
[h]earsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable 
available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. 
Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in 
favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption 
remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were 
provided.18 
Although Rasul and Hamdi were both decided in the context of 
habeas petitions, they stand for the principle that even enemy combatants 
have certain inalienable rights that will be recognized by the courts.19 
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that detaining these individuals on 
the basis of hearsay did not violate the Constitution, provided the 
detainee has a fair opportunity to challenge this evidence.20 
In the days following the Rasul and Hamdi decisions, U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz responded by establishing 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to determine whether 
detainees being held in Guantanamo Bay were properly designated as 
“enemy combatants.”21 The Order defined enemy combatants as 
individuals who were “part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces 
  
 16. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 524-25 (2004). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 533-34. 
 19. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’y of the Navy (July 
7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
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or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities….”22 The CSRTs 
provided that detainees have a military officer represent them at a 
hearing, and that the officer share any information with them regarding 
their charges except for classified information.23 The tribunals consisted 
of 3 commissioned officers, and detainees were allowed to call witnesses 
if those witnesses were reasonably available.24 It was the province of the 
tribunal to determine the availability of the witnesses.25 Moreover, 
detainees had the right to testify before the tribunal but were not required 
to.26 In keeping with Hamdi, the tribunal was allowed to consider hearsay 
evidence, as long as it took into account the reliability of the 
information.27 However, other than that, the rules with respect to hearsay 
were vague and great deference was given to the tribunal for determining 
whether a piece of hearsay is reliable. 
On December 30, 2005, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005 (DTA), which essentially codified the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals.28 The DTA also sought to eliminate the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions as established by Hamdi, in favor of 
a more limited review by the D.C. Court of Appeals.29 However, the 
DTA and the CSRTs were short lived. Less than two years after their 
creation, the Supreme Court struck down the DTA for violating the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention in the case 
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.30 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 
found the Hamdan commission to be flawed for several reasons, 
including that the defendant could be prevented from learning certain 
evidence being used against him and that the commission could admit 
  
 22. Id. at 1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 2. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1005-1006, 119 
Stat. 2739 (2005). 
 29. Id. §§ 1005(e)(2)(A)-(B), 1005(e)(3)(A)-(C).    
 30. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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hearsay evidence, even if it was the product of torture.31 Congress 
quickly responded by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
which sought to remedy the procedural flaws noted by the Court in 
Hamdan.32 The 2006 Act kept much of the procedures under the DTA 
intact, including the admission of hearsay evidence, and places the 
burden on the adverse party to prove that the proffered evidence is 
unreliable or lacks probative value.33 
While the Military Commissions Act of 2006 attempted to address the 
concerns raised by the Supreme Court in earlier decisions, the Act failed 
to satisfy this goal. Shortly after its passage, it, too, was struck down as 
unconstitutional in Boumediene v. Bush.34 The Court found that the 
Act’s suspension of judicial review for detainee’s habeas petitions 
constituted an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.35 In a strongly-
worded dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Scalia and Thomas, 
chastised the majority’s holding that the enemy combatants should have 
access to domestic courts and noted that the detainees at Guantanamo 
already have more rights than exist under the Geneva Convention.36 
Finally, in October of 2009, Congress passed the Military 
Commissions Act of 2009, which provided additional rights to the 
detainees, including the right of judicial review on their habeas claims.37 
  
 31. Id. at 613-17 (“Another striking feature of the rules governing Hamdan’s 
commission is that they permit the admission of any evidence that, in the opinion of the 
presiding officer, would have probative value to a reasonable person. Under this test, not 
only is testimonial hearsay and evidence obtained through coercion fully admissible, but 
neither live testimony nor witnesses’ written statements need be sworn.”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
 32. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §949a, 120 Stat. 
2600 (2006). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 817 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“And yet the Guantanamo detainees are 
hardly denied all legal assistance. They are provided a ‘Personal Representative’ who . . . 
may access classified information, help the detainee arrange for witnesses, assist the 
detainee’s preparation of his case, and even aid the detainee in presenting his evidence to 
the tribunal.”).  
 37. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574-612 (2009). 
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Interestingly, the Act of 2009 also set forth a more comprehensive 
framework for the admissibility of hearsay during the commissions.38 In 
order for hearsay to now be admissible, (1) the proponent must make it 
known to the adverse party of its intention to use hearsay; (2) the judge 
must consider “all of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the 
statement, including the degree to which the statement is corroborated, 
the indicia of reliability within the statement itself, and whether the will 
of the declarant was overborne” and then determine that the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact, the statement is probative, direct 
testimony of the witness is not practical, and finally, that the interests of 
justice are served.39 This standard is further set forth in Rule 803(b) of 
the Manual for Military Commissions of 2012, which details the rules of 
procedures of the commission.40 
There is no question that the rights and procedures afforded to the 
defendants in the military commissions are more expansive today than 
they were in the early days of the Bush administration. In addition to 
providing a more specific framework for the admissibility of hearsay, the 
2009 amendments also prohibit the admissibility of statements made 
under duress or as the result of torture.41 This includes a prohibition of 
statements elicited through “torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment” as well as forced self-incrimination.42  
While the rules governing the use of hearsay in military commissions 
have evolved, the commissions will never be seen as legitimate in the 
eyes of the international community if they are viewed as being 
inconsistent with international norms. Therefore, it is necessary to 
compare the hearsay standards, as set forth in the 2009 amendments, 
with those of the international community. 
  
 38. Id. at 2582-83. 
 39. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(3) (2009). 
 40. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, pt. III, R. 803(b) 
(2012), available at  
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/2012ManualForMilitaryCommissions.pdf. 
 41. 10 U.S.C. § 948r. 
 42. Id.  
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II. HEARSAY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Critics of the military commissions point to hearsay as one of the 
reasons why the detainees purportedly cannot receive a fair trial in 
Guantanamo Bay. It is well-settled that the Confrontation Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution provides the right for those accused of crimes to face 
their accusers in open court.43 Generally, this clause prohibits the 
prosecution from introducing out-of-court statements from victims or 
witnesses in their case in chief.44 In other words, a witness in a criminal 
prosecution must testify live, in person, and be subject to cross-
examination.45 While there is some evidence that the confrontation 
principle dates back until at least ancient Roman times, this strict ban on 
hearsay is a uniquely Anglo-American common law concept.46 In fact, 
international courts today usually admit hearsay evidence under certain 
circumstances.47 Moreover, international tribunals dating back to 
Nuremberg have been providing fair trials to defendants using certain 
types of hearsay.48 While it is agreed that the Guantanamo Bay 
defendants should be entitled to fair legal process, opinions differ on how 
  
 43. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him”). 
 44. Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303, 309 (1894) (stating that hearsay is 
the prior out-of-court statements of a person, offered affirmatively for the truth of the 
matters asserted, presented at trial either orally by another person or in written form); 
FED. R. EVID. 801(c).  
 45. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (holding that “the right of 
cross-examination is included in the right . . . to confront the witness[]”). 
 46. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988); see also Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (“English common law has long differed from 
continental civil law in regard to the manner in which witnesses give testimony in 
criminal trials. The common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to 
adversarial testing, while the civil law condones examination in private by judicial 
officers.”). 
 47. See David Weissbrodt et al., Piercing the Confidentiality Veil: Physician 
Testimony in International Criminal Trials Against Perpetrators of Torture, 15 MINN. J. 
INT’L L. 43, 61 (2006). 
 48. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis Powers, and Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal art. 19, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. (hereinafter “Nuremberg 
Charter”). 
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to achieve this. Some scholars have noted that “[l]egal process may be 
fair and meaningful even if detainees are not afforded the full panoply of 
safeguards that a state ordinarily affords criminal defendants. Many such 
safeguards reflect a state’s own legal and normative traditions and are 
not required by international law.”49 
Whether the 9/11 defendants should be entitled to all the same 
protections as any criminal defendant in the American court system is an 
interesting question worthy of discussion. However, that question is 
immensely different than the question of whether the Guantanamo 
commissions, as they exist today, can provide a fair trial that stands up to 
international scrutiny. Critics who accuse the United States of violating 
international law in the Guantanamo military commissions should be 
reminded of certain similarities between these military commissions and 
the UN-sanctioned and internationally recognized tribunals for other war 
criminals. For instance, there is no ban on the use of hearsay among the 
many rights enumerated in the Geneva Convention.50 There is also no 
ban on hearsay for the International Criminal Court, the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, all of which were sanctioned by the United 
Nations.51 In fact, the Nuremberg trials following World War II, which 
were the first military tribunals of modern times, also did not ban hearsay 
evidence.52 The Nuremberg trials further confirm the notion that “a ban 
on hearsay is not an internationally recognized judicial guarantee.”53 In 
fact, some have argued that the use of hearsay - even hearsay from 
anonymous witnesses - is so common that it risks becoming the norm in 
international criminal tribunals.54 
  
 49. Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: 
Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 369, 408 
(2008). 
 50. Morris D. Davis, Op-Ed., The Guantánamo I Know, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 
2007, at A21. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See David Lusty, Anonymous Accusers: An Historical & Comparative 
Analysis of Secret Witnesses in Criminal Trials, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 361 (2002). 
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Historically, the rules of evidence have been relaxed in wartime 
tribunals and courts were given wide-latitude to admit any evidence the 
court found to have probative value.55 Article 19 of the Nuremberg 
Charter specifically freed the tribunal of “technical rules of evidence” 
instead favoring “expeditious and non-technical procedures.”56 
Accordingly, hearsay evidence was admitted with much greater 
frequency than typically allowed under the national laws at the time.57 
This included allowing unsworn testimony from deceased individuals.58 
The proper role hearsay has resurfaced in recent years in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). By way 
of background, the United Nations Security Council established the 
ICTY in February of 1993, to prosecute the alleged perpetrators of 
widespread human rights violations within the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia.59 Thereafter, on May 25, 1993, the Security Council adopted 
The Statute of the International Tribunal, which set forth certain rules 
and procedures for the ICTY.60 The statute provided that the judges of 
the ICTY were responsible for drafting the rules of evidence that would 
apply throughout the proceedings.61 While the ICTY procedural rules 
initially indicated a preference for live testimony, they have always been 
more open than the American system for allowing the use of depositions, 
video testimony, transcripts of prior testimony, and the taking of judicial 
notice.62 More recently, the rules of evidence of the ICTY have been 
  
 55. U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XV 
at 197 (1949). 
 56. Nuremberg Charter, Art. 19. 
 57. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 40. 
 58. United States v. Karl Brandt et al., Case No. 1, at 1 (Nuremberg Military 
Trib. 1946) (“The Medical Case”) (accepting unsworn witness statements and sworn 
witness statements of deceased individuals); see also United States v. Josef Altstotter et 
al., Case No. 3, at 1 (Nuremberg Military Trib. 1947) (“The Justice Case”) (accepting 
sworn witness statements of deceased individuals). 
 59. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,  U.N. Doc. S/RES/808, at 1 (Feb. 22, 
1993). 
 60. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., , U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 at 1-2 (May 
25, 1993). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Patricia M. Wald, Running the Trial of the Century: The Nuremberg Legacy, 
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1559, 1588 (2006). 
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relaxed even further to allow for the admission of written witness 
statements, provided they do not go to prove the accused’s conduct.63  
When deciding whether to admit hearsay evidence that one side has 
objected to, one ICTY trial court stated that: 
[T]he Trial Chamber will determine whether the proffered evidence is 
relevant and has probative value, focusing on its reliability . . . The 
Trial Chamber may be guided by, but not bound to, hearsay exceptions 
generally recognized by some national legal systems, as well as the 
truthfulness, voluntariness, and trustworthiness of the evidence, as 
appropriate.64 
Interestingly, the prosecutor of the Tadic tribunal, Alan Tieger, 
commented after the trial that the tribunal’s lax hearsay rules actually 
limited the amount of hearsay that was ultimately admitted.65 Although 
one witness did testify anonymously, Tieger noted that: 
[T]he very fact that there was no specific prohibition on hearsay meant 
that there were no specific exceptions allowing its use. That in turn 
meant that every attempt to introduce hearsay was accompanied by 
lengthy argument about its propriety, which tended to focus more 
attention on that particular piece of evidence than the proponent ever 
intended. Since both sides wanted the court to focus on the most 
reliable, persuasive, and significant evidence, the process tended to 
become self-regulating as the parties became gun shy about hearsay. 
Virtually all of the hearsay admitted fell within exceptions that would 
be recognized in jurisdictions regarded as much more stringent with 
  
 63. Id. at 1589.  
 64. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion on 
Hearsay (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Aug. 5, 1996); Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
Case No. IT-94-1, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 555 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former 
Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). 
 65. Alan Tieger, Prosecutor, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in War Crimes Tribunals: the Record and the 
Prospects, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1441, 1445 (1998). 
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respect to that rule, and none of the hearsay dealt with the critical acts 
charged or the essential elements of proof.66 
In the trial of Stanislav Galic, a Commander in the Bosnian Serb 
Army who was charged with violating the laws of war in regards to an 
attack on civilian populations in Sarajevo, prosecutors sought to 
introduce two written statements from witnesses made to investigators 
for the prosecution.67 Both witnesses died before they could testify at 
trial.68 Under American law, those witness statements would be 
suppressed, unless the government could demonstrate that witness gave 
prior testimony under oath and that the defendant had a full and fair 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness on the contents of the 
statement. Otherwise, the statement would be inadmissible. The ICTY’s 
Appeals Chamber engaged in a careful analysis of the Court’s Rules of 
Evidence concerning hearsay evidence.69 Rule 92bis(C) of the ICTY 
allows for the introduction of a witness’s written statements when that 
witness has died or “can no longer with reasonable diligence be traced” 
or cannot testify due to a physical or mental disability, provided that the 
Court “finds from the circumstances in which the statement was made 
and recorded that there are satisfactory indicia of its reliability.”70 
Interestingly, the requirements under Rule 92bis(C) of the ICTY are 
substantively similar to the rules of evidence at play in the Guantanamo 
Commissions.71 
The ICTY is not the only international tribunal of recent years to 
allow for the admissibility of some hearsay evidence. The Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which was established to prosecute violations 
of international law that occurred during Sierra Leone’s civil war, has 
  
 66. Id.  
 67. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal concerning Rule 92 bis (C), ¶ 8 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia June 
7, 2002). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. ICTY R. 92 bis(C) (emphasis added). 
 71. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2739 
(2005).  
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also grappled with the appropriate use of hearsay evidence.72 In the trial 
of Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia, the Court analyzed 
hearsay testimony in the context of the U.S. Constitution’s Confrontation 
Clause and found it to be admissible.73 
By way of background, Taylor was indicted by the SCSL in May 
2006 and charged with several counts of murder, rape, enslavement, and 
other crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Sierre Leone 
between 1996 and 2002.74 The trial commenced in April 2007 and after 
roughly five years, Taylor was convicted and sentenced to 50 years 
confinement.75 The defense appealed his conviction on multiple grounds, 
including the erroneous introduction of evidence.76 Specifically, the 
defense argued that the Trial Chamber relied on “uncorroborated 
hearsay” and failed to assess the reliability of hearsay evidence.77 In its 
decision, the Appeals Chamber noted that it “does not accept that as a 
general principle of law applicable to international criminal proceedings, 
uncorroborated hearsay evidence can never be the sole or decisive basis 
for a conviction.”78 The Appeals Chamber went on to cite a decision 
from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which held that 
“reliance on an uncorroborated hearsay statement as the sole or decisive 
basis for a conviction is not precluded as a matter of law and does not per 
se violate the accused’s right to a fair trial.”79 The Appeals Chamber also 
noted that ECtHR decisions have been “recognized by international 
criminal tribunals as a source of guidance regarding fair trial rights.”80  
Interestingly, Taylor’s defense cited the U.S. Supreme Court case of 
Crawford v. Washington, which held that prior testimonial statements, 
not subject to cross-examination, violate the Confrontation Clause.81 
  
 72. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment (Spec. Ct. for 
Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 5.  
 75. Id. at 11, 14. 
 76. Id. at 16.  
 77. Id. at 47. 
 78. Id. at 82. 
 79. Id. at 85 (citing Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. U.K. 147).  
 80. Id. at 84.  
 81. Id. at 35 n. 182.; see also Crawford, supra note 46, at 68.  
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Rather than recognizing Crawford as a widely-accepted norm in criminal 
prosecutions, the Appeals Chamber stated that Crawford is “a decision of 
a domestic court applying its domestic constitution,” and went on to note 
that Crawford applies only to testimonial statements.82 If a testimonial 
statement is a uniquely civilian concept, as some have argued, then the 
U.S. Constitution’s Confrontation Clause does not apply to military 
commissions.83 Nevertheless, the Taylor Appeals Chamber found that the 
tribunal “embodies the principle articulated in Crawford and Davis [v. 
Washington] ….”84 One must not be of the impression that the SCSL 
allowed the introduction of any and all hearsay evidence in the trial of 
Charles Taylor. To the contrary, the Appeals Chamber noted the 
precautions and procedures that must be followed to ensure the reliability 
of the evidence.85 In its decision, the Appeals Chamber found that the 
trial court examined hearsay evidence with caution before allowing it 
into evidence, noting that “the weight to be afforded to such evidence 
will usually be less than that accorded to the evidence of a witness who 
has given the evidence under oath . . . and who has been tested in cross-
examination.”86 The Appeals Chamber went on to find that the trial court 
“took into account whether or not the hearsay evidence was voluntary, 
truthful, and trustworthy, and considered both its context and the 
circumstances under which it arose.”87 
There exists a perception among some, that the international criminal 
tribunals such as the ICTY and SCSL are inherently unfair due, in part, 
to their admission of certain hearsay evidence.88 However, according to 
  
 82. Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 71, at 35 n.182.  
 83. Christina M. Frohock, Military Justice as Justice: Fitting Confrontation 
Clause Jurisprudence into Military Commissions, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 255, 255 (2014). 
 84. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 71, at 83 n.182. 
 85. Id. at 149-51. 
 86. Id. at 150.  
 87. Id. 
 88. See David Aronofsky, International War Crimes & Other Criminal Courts: 
Ten Recommendations for Where We Go from Here and How to Get There - Looking to 
a Permanent International Criminal Tribunal, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 17, 24 
(2006) (“One of the most polemic themes involving international criminal tribunals to 
date has involved the use of anonymous witnesses, which involves hearsay problems that 
call into question the fairness of the underlying trials.”). 
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Professor Jenia Iontcheva Turner, who surveyed forty-four defense 
attorneys who had represented accused persons before the ICTY, SCSL 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the vast 
majority believe that the “trials serve primarily adjudicative purposes - 
separating the innocent from the guilty, following fair procedures, and 
apportioning just punishment to those who are convicted.”89 The defense 
attorneys she surveyed had a general belief that their clients were 
innocent, that the results of the tribunal were not pre-determined and that 
it was possible to get an acquittal.90 In fact, both the ICTY and ICTR 
have resulted in acquittals.91 
The international community has recognized the need for flexibility 
when it comes to the admissibility of evidence in wartime tribunals.92 
Patricia Wald, former Judge of the ICTY, has written about the 
challenges in procuring witnesses to testify in the tribunal and the need 
for a “hybrid admissibility standard” when it comes to witness 
testimony.93 The ICTY has recognized not only the difficulties in finding 
witnesses to come forward and testify about war crimes, but also the 
fallibility of live testimony.94 This includes a recognition that “all live 
testimony carries with it the possibility of distortion as to what really 
occurred.”95 While the ICTY and other international tribunals favor the 
use of live testimony, as they should, they provide necessary exceptions 
and accommodations, much like the commissions in Guantanamo. 
  
 89. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in 
International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 529, 531 (2008). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Acquittals, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/9984 (last visited Sept. 23, 
2014); Appeals Chamber Acquits and Releases Justin Mugenzi and Prosper Mugiranza, 
ICTR, http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1344 (last visited Sept. 23, 
2014). 
 92. Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from 
the Yugoslav Tribunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 217, 219-20 (2002). 
 93. Id. at 227. 
 94. Id. at 225-27. 
 95. Id. at 226. 
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III. THE USE OF HEARSAY IN GUANTANAMO COMMISSIONS 
If the international tribunals of recent years teach us anything with 
respect to hearsay, it is that hearsay must be corroborated, reliable, and 
admitted with caution. Accordingly, in order for the Guantanamo 
commissions to be fair and legitimate, this standard must be met. The 
necessity of certain types of hearsay may arise from the realities of war. 
The MCA recognizes that “many witnesses in a military commission 
prosecution are likely to be foreign nationals who are not amenable to 
process, and other witnesses may be unavailable because of military 
necessity, incarceration, injury, or death.”96 The specific instances in 
which hearsay is likely to arise deserve a closer look.  
There are currently six military commissions underway in 
Guantanamo, however, only three are currently being actively 
prosecuted. One of the active cases is for the five defendants accused of 
masterminding or facilitating the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.97 
Their names are Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid Bin Attash, Ramzi 
Binalshibh, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali and Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi.98 The 
second is for Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged mastermind of the 
USS Cole bombing on October 12, 2000.99  
In capital cases, such as the two currently underway, the commission 
consists of a military judge and twelve members.100 The members are 
commissioned officers from all branches of the armed forces and serve 
the role of a jury.101 “Each member has an equal voice” on the panel and 
“[n]o member may use rank or position to influence another.”102 The 
  
 96. MILTARY COMM’NS R. EVID 802, Discussion. 
 97. Charge Sheet at 17-20, Unites States v. Mohammed (Military Comm’ns 
2001), available at  
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(Sworn%20Charges).pdf. 
 98. Id. at 1. 
 99. See Charge Sheet, United States v. Al Nashiri (Military Comm’ns 2011), 
available at  
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alNashiri2/Al%20Nashiri%20II%20(Sworn%20Charge
s).pdf. 
 100. R. MILITARY COMM’NS 501(a)(2). 
 101. R. MILITARY COMM’NS 502(a)(2). 
 102. Id. 
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selection process is quite similar to civilian criminal trials. A voir dire 
process takes place whereby the prospective members are questioned by 
the attorneys for both sides, as well as by the military judge.103 Members 
can be removed for cause and each side is granted one peremptory 
challenge.104 Once the members are selected, the presentation of 
evidence is also quite similar to civilian trials. The prosecution presents 
its evidence first, followed by the defense, followed by rebuttals from 
each side.105 Witnesses must testify under oath, and are subject to direct 
and cross-examination, and re-direct and re-cross as necessary.106 The 
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and guilt must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.107 Once all the evidence has been 
presented, the members deliberate in a closed session and voting is done 
by secret ballot.108 A two-thirds majority is needed to convict, and on 
capital charges, the verdict must be unanimous.109  
In the al-Nashiri matter, the government has already put the defense 
on notice that it intends to offer out-of-court statements of a witness in 
their case-in-chief.110 Specifically, the prosecution seeks to offer the 
statement of Saleh Hussein Mohammed Al-Akl, who allegedly rented 
property to the accused in August 1999.111 Al-Ak1, a Yemeni citizen, 
was interviewed in Yemen by the agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in December 2000.112 In lieu of Al-Akl’s testimony at 
trial, the government will call one of the FBI agents who interviewed 
him and the FBA agent will testify that Al-Akl appeared healthy, had no 
  
 103. R. MILITARY COMM’NS 912(d). 
 104. R. MILITARY COMM’NS 912(f)-(g). 
 105. R. MILITARY COMM’NS 913(c)(1)(A)-(D). 
 106. R. MILITARY COMM’NS 913(c)(2). 
 107. R. MILITARY COMM’NS 920(e)(5)(A). 
 108. R. MILITARY COMM’NS 921(a), (c). 
 109. R. MILITARY COMM’NS 921(c)(2). 
 110. See Notice to the Defense of the Government’s Intention to Offer Certain 
Items of Corroborated, Lawfully Obtained, Probative, and Reliable Hearsay Evidence 
Where the Declarants are Unavailable, Hostilities Pose Unique Circumstances, and 
Admission is in the Interest of Justice, United States v. Al Nashiri (Military Comm’ns 
2013), available at  
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alNashiri2/Al%20Nashiri%20II%20(AE166).pdf. 
 111. Id. at 3.  
 112. Id.  
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bruises or marks on his body, and spoke freely without coercion.113 The 
agent will further testify that his FBI colleagues took contemporaneous 
notes of Al-Akl’s statements, which formed the contents of the report 
that the government wishes to admit.114 
According to the prosecution, Al-Akl recognized the accused in a 
photo array and was able to confirm certain biographical information 
concerning al-Nashiri.115 Additionally, Al-Akl’s statement that he was al-
Nashiri’s landlord is further corroborated by a lease dated August 22, 
1999, which was purportedly signed by al-Nashiri.116 Al-Akl’s testimony 
is important to the government’s case because he stated to investigators 
that al-Nashiri had a boat at the rented property that matched the 
description of the boat used in the October 2000 attack.117 The 
description of the boat is further corroborated by at least a dozen other 
witnesses.118 Al-Akl has provided other evidence that the government 
believes is helpful to their case. For instance, Al-Akl allegedly told the 
investigators that he remembered smelling resin or epoxy, which can be 
used to repair fiberglass, and that he remembers men painting the boat an 
off-white color.119 Witnesses describe the attack boat as made of 
fiberglass, painted an off-white color.120 
The government argues that Al-Akl’s statements to the FBI 
investigators on December 23, 2000, should be admitted despite being 
out of court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
In their notice papers, the government acknowledges that Al-Akl’s 
statements could be considered hearsay, however, it argues that “the 
interests of justice are strongly served by admitting Al-Akl’s 
demonstrably voluntary, reliable, and highly probative statements, which 
are overwhelmingly corroborated by an interlocking web of meticulously 
gathered physical, forensic, and documentary evidence.”121 
  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 4.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 5.  
 118. Id. at 5-6.  
 119. Id. at 6.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 8.  
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Based on this one example, the evidence offered by the prosecution 
appears to be reliable and highly probative. Moreover, the fear of secret 
witnesses being the sole basis of a conviction is far-removed. Here, the 
person providing the information is readily identified. The circumstances 
of the witness’s statement are well known and the agent who recorded 
the statement is subject to cross-examination. The panel members will be 
able to weigh the credibility of this investigator and determine whether 
the statement has the overall indicia of reliability. Furthermore, the risk 
of prejudice to the defendant if certain hearsay is admitted is less severe 
in military commissions than in civilian court. As noted above, 
commission panelists consist of military professions who are trained and 
experienced in following orders. They are more likely than civilian lay 
jurors to carefully follow the rule of law and apply the appropriate 
reliability analysis to any hearsay that has been introduced. 
In addition to being fair for the accused, the flexible standard of 
evidence in military commissions is also necessary. Under domestic law, 
the exclusionary rule suppresses evidence that was obtained by police 
without a warrant and statements that were made by suspects who had 
not been properly Mirandized.122 However, there is no precedent for the 
exclusionary rule to apply in war scenarios abroad. In fact, in his 
testimony concerning the proposed 2009 amendments to the Military 
Commissions Act before the Senate Judiciary’s Subcommittee on 
Terrorism and Homeland Security, Assistant Attorney General David 
Kris acknowledged that military commissions “take into account the 
reality of battlefield situations and military exigencies, while affording 
the accused due process.”123 He went on to note that the Justice 
Department “[does] not support requiring our soldiers to give Miranda 
warnings to enemy forces captured on the battlefield, and nothing in our 
proposal would require this result, nor would it preclude admission of 
voluntary but non-Mirandized statements in military commissions.”124 It 
  
 122. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 439 (1966). 
 123. Prosecuting Terrorists: Civilian and Military Trials for GTMO and Beyond, 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Terrorism and Homeland Security of the S. Comm. On 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong.  (2009) (statement of Asst. Att’y Gen. David Kris,), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg57711/pdf/CHRG-111shrg57711.pdf. 
 124. Id. at 2. 
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is absurd to imagine how otherwise credible information obtained by 
U.S. troops on the battlefield would be suppressed because a soldier did 
not properly read Miranda rights to a foreign enemy combatant. 
Moreover, contemporary criminal procedure, such as the exclusionary 
rule, is designed to regulate police conduct in our society, and has little 
to no bearing on the credibility of the evidence recovered.125 
The limitations of American criminal procedure are clear when 
applied to wartime scenarios. Without a more flexible standard for the 
introduction of evidence, it is possible that none of the 9/11 defendants 
could ever be brought to justice.  In fact, some have rightfully noted that: 
[R]eliance on hearsay is even more crucial in this war because many 
witnesses are likely to be foreign nationals, and compelling them to 
appear at the commission might be difficult; also, many will be 
unavailable due to imprisonment or even death at the hands of al 
Qaeda, or in other cases, their own governments.126 
If the prosecutions of the 9/11 defendants, or other enemy combatants, 
could not go forward because of witnesses who were deceased, missing, 
imprisoned, or otherwise outside the government’s subpoena power, the 
end result would be a tremendous injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
While the rules of evidence with respect to hearsay are looser in the 
military commissions at Guantanamo Bay than in federal courts, the 
rights and protections of the accused are in keeping with international 
norms. Of course, the fairness of the military commissions does not rest 
on the use of hearsay alone. Serious allegations have surfaced involving 
claims that some secret agency may have surreptitiously listened to  
privileged conversations between the defendants and their attorneys,127 
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and also that certain legal papers in the defendants’ possession were 
discarded.128 Although there is no evidence that any privileged 
information was compromised, the mere existence of these claims may 
undermine the public’s confidence in the commissions. They also 
provide additional fodder to the commissions’ critics. To that end, the 
government has a duty to seriously address these allegations and others 
that may arise during future proceedings.   
Additionally, while the defendants in the military commissions have 
adequate rights and processes, not all of the Guantanamo detainees will 
even be tried before a court.129 Both the Obama and Bush administrations 
have conceded that there are certain detainees who will never be brought 
up on charges and will likely be held indefinitely.130 This remains a 
delicate issue that runs the risk of overshadowing the legitimacy of the 
military commissions, no matter how far they have come in ensuring 
fairness for the accused. 
However, while the Guantanamo military commissions lack every 
procedural protection available to defendants in American criminal 
courts, the rights and procedures, particularly those involving hearsay, 
are appropriate under the circumstances and defensible under 
international law. 
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